

## Summary Evaluation of the Audit Report

While every page of the report contains errors of fact or material crying for debate, the following outline the major problems:

1. The recommendations do not seem to be born out of the problems and environment described. They seem to offer a cheap, risk-free satisfaction of SAFE needs. They actually offer a rudimentary partial satisfaction of a small sub-set of needs with a likelihood that progress beyond that point would be extremely expensive. It is a course which, while it cannot fail, cannot succeed.
2. The argument for changing hardware, while it has some merit, is largely specious. In particular it compares Burroughs hardware requirements against performance goals with IBM-compatible requirements with no performance requirements.
3. Development of common backbone system is recommended after asserting that there is no commonality.

4. More practical alternatives are not discussed. Minimum risk tends to align with minimum gain but if CIA should switch to IBM and a \$100K software package then, DIA should upgrade in Honeywell and avoid the conversion and development effort. PMO could be provided separately at less risk. Or DIA could have all the Burroughs equipment and overpower the performance issue while minimizing development. There are others as good or better which warrant attention.
5. Not mentioned is the much-increased likelihood of success on the present course if performance, schedule and cost are dealt with even half as freely as in the proposed alternative. (While schedule to get PMO is short, all other elements would take longer than the current course if performance goals were not waived).
6. It is acknowledged that a distributed system (as designed) is required to meet SAFE goals. The opposite, however, is proposed. Goals of performance for numbers of analysts against needed file sizes then are tacitly eliminated.

7. It is assumed that funding will be available. The report totally destroys the current contractor's credibility as well as most of the Government's team. Why then, should the Government fund further work by that contractor? (who incidentally happens to have absolutely no technical capabilities in the course prescribed).
8. The report dwells excessively on perceived errors of process and inadequately describes the factual status. This may be due to the short time allowed. It further goes to extreme length to establish perceived culpability and draws rather too much on Selfridge's paper.
9. The perception is created of a report designed to bring about a desired end recommendation by discrediting the current course. While there is much to criticize in the current situation, it is difficult to believe that so much incompetence and stupidity could have been applied for so long to the problem. Even malfeasance could not have produced the situation described.

10. In general the report suggests abandoning a course to satisfying the major needs of the analysts but a course having known problems, in favor of a course to satisfying a small sub-set of those needs but having totally unknown problems.